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For over a decade now, casino gaming has been the political
issue that just keeps on marching along in Connecticut politics.
Think this Energizer bunny will finally wind down because the
General Assembly has repealed the State’s “Las Vegas night” law,
or because the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs has rejected the
Golden Hill Paugussets’ application for recognition as a tribe?
Don’t bet on it.  Too many people have big stakes in the issue 
for it to run out of juice any time soon. 
The two existing casinos (Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun) and
their owners (the Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan tribes,
respectively) are the only major players in the ever-swirling con-
troversy who are not continuously caught up in casino politics.
They are too busy running their highly successful businesses
and playing the major statewide roles they have thus earned.
Doubtless, they take comfort that the only other major player
that could cause them trouble, the State of Connecticut, can’t
afford to do anything that would threaten its $400 million yearly
rakeoff from slot machine profits (on which more later).
Whence, then, the staying power of this political issue?
Simple: politics-as-usual, and the economic profits or “rents”
offered by the casino business.
The Politics-as-Usual of Casino Gaming
The contending political forces include the usual suspects:
institutions such as churches that have long relied on casino
nights to raise money; the economic interests (e.g., workers and
suppliers) that have sprung up around Foxwoods and Mohegan
Sun; and the small towns nearby that have had to cope with the
attendant auto traffic and other headaches.  But the main politi-
cal force keeping the casino issue alive is public sentiment
against gambling.
Moral opposition, often on religious grounds, is only one com-
ponent of that sentiment, but it is the most focused.  The aston-
ishing commercial success of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun has
mobilized this opposition, where the small-change wagering of
the State lottery could not.  With all the talk of a third casino at
the end of 2002, elected officials responded to the focused heat
on this issue by repealing the State’s Las Vegas night law in
early January 2003.  (The repeal, which exempted the existing
casinos, is not expected to stand up to legal challenge, giving
legislators and the governor a free ride on this one.)
Broader public sentiment against gambling shows up as a
vague unease about gaming as recreation.  Public surveys have
repeatedly found that people—even those who gamble—over-
state the extent of social problems related to legalized gaming,
and view it as yielding negative net benefits, despite the size-
able, and visible, economic benefits and apparently modest
social harm.
The accompanying box summarizes what we seem to know
about that harm.  It is key in thinking about the social harm (as
well as about the economic benefits) to focus on the incremental
effects of adding a large casino to a region.  The casinos’ effects
at the margin on crime and traffic appear no different from those
of any large-scale new venture, except for crimes committed to
support the habits of new gambling addicts.
To the extent a new casino would expand the total amount of
gambling, gambling addiction would apparently increase by a
modest though noticeable amount.   But the distribution of the
increase by income levels or ethnicity could be undesirable.  The
National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC) in 2000
reported estimates of “pathological” or “problem” gamblers
ranging from 1.7% up to 7.3% of the population.  (Evidence
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How much MORE crime, traffic, and pathological or problem gambling is there in Connecticut because of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun?
CRIME:       Some problem gamblers commit crime to support their habits.
                    But more people frequenting any local area will mean more crime there.
                    And the non-gambling areas inside the casinos are family-friendly.
 TRAFFIC:    More out-of-town cars and buses are going to and from the casino region than before.
                   Local traffic is worse, too.
                    More total gambling will likely mean more gambling addicts. 
                   But lotteries and other "neighborhood" gambling venues, not casinos, provide the most "prevalent" forms of gaming.
                   A national US commission in 2000 reported estimates of addictive-gambling incidence ranging from 1.7% to 7.3% of the population.
                    But evidence from more gambling-friendly Australia suggests a figure towards the low end of the range.
                   Survey respondents near new casinos exaggerated the incidence of gambling addiction. 
                    But 13% of gambling patrons self-reported as "lifetime" problem or pathological gamblers.
                   Blacks and Hispanics seem to be more prone to gambling addiction than whites--perhaps because of differences in income levels.
                   The effects of gambling addiction on the affected individuals, families, and co-workers are often devastating.
But increased traffic usually follows any increase in economic activity.
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GAMBLING13 The Connecticut Economy Winter 2003
from Australia, where gambling is more prevalent and viewed
more tolerantly than in this country, suggests an incidence of
gambling addiction close to the low end of the NGISC esti-
mates.)  Among patrons of “gambling establishments” surveyed,
however, some 14% said they were “lifetime problem or patho-
logical gamblers”.  Interestingly, B. Grant Stitt and others, in the
Winter 2000 Journal of Gambling Studies, found that residents of
communities near recently opened casinos considerably overesti-
mated the overall incidence of gambling addiction, at about one-
sixth of the population.
Other survey data, including studies cited by the NGISC and
by John W. Welte and his colleagues (Journal of Gambling
Studies, Winter 2002), have found that state lotteries and other
“neighborhood”-level gambling venues are the most readily
available, although casinos account for the heaviest gambling
“involvement” by amounts wagered.  Blacks were less likely to
gamble, but to play more heavily when they did, than either
whites or Hispanics.  Rates of pathological gambling were higher
among blacks and Hispanics than among whites.  That may be
tied to income differences, as people better off were more likely
to participate in gambling, but less likely to have problems with
it, than those less well off.  And New Englanders gambled more
than other Americans—perhaps due in part to having two world-
class casinos in a relatively small region.
Finally, while the macro impacts of gambling addiction may
be modest, the micro effects—on individuals, families, and co-
workers—are often devastating.
Create Monopolies and Investors Will Come
Moral misgivings about gambling aside, a simple economic
fact of life in today’s Connecticut will help keep the Energizer
bunny’s batteries charged: some $400 million, or more than 3%,
of State revenue comes directly from the casinos’ profits on slot
machines.  In the current fiscal crisis, 3% of total State revenue
ain’t hay.
Government bans on gaming have long given rise to the
monopoly “rents” that attract criminals into the business.  Las
Vegas itself grew out of the legal deployment in Nevada of ill-
gotten gains from other states by Bugsy Siegel and his cronies.
The state lotteries, which began in the 1970s, and more recently
legalized casino gaming in New Jersey, Connecticut and a grow-
ing number of other states, have taken some of the edge off Las
Vegas’s glitter—and sent Nevada entrepreneurs like Steve Wynn
looking for new opportunities elsewhere.
Though Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun are legal entities, the
struggle over whether to allow a third casino in Connecticut is
stoked by monopoly rents from State-set limitations on entry.
Through no fault (or wisdom) of our own, Connecticut wound
up in the 1990s helping demonstrate the enormous untapped
market that existed for legalized high-stakes casino gaming.  A
key step was the 1991 deal between the Mashantucket Pequot
tribe and then-Governor Lowell Weicker to allow slot machines
at Foxwoods, but only there, in return for a 25% State share of
the net profits (total handle minus payout).  Because
Connecticut’s Las Vegas night law didn’t cover the enormously
profitable slots, they didn’t automatically fall under the umbrella
of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 that forced
the State to negotiate with the tribe over establishing the casino.
Even with the extension of Gov. Weicker’s “crown monopoly” on
slot machines to the state’s second casino, Mohegan Sun (with
the acquiescence of the Mashantucket Pequots), Connecticut’s
casino industry still generates monopoly rents that sing a siren
song to would-be investors in new casinos.
The State’s “royalties” from slots profits, now some $400 mil-
lion a year, give Nutmeggers of all stripes a stake in maintaining
the crown monopoly.  That’s why, a few years ago, the State set
a 9-figure entry fee for the then-proposed Bridgeport casino,
sinking Steve Wynn’s hopes for that particular project. And
that’s why the legislature exempted the two existing casinos
when it repealed the Las Vegas night law.
What would be the fate of a third casino in Connecticut?  The
answer is not straightforward.  Not surprisingly, it has a lot to
do with whether the State, willingly or not, puts its share of the
crown-monopoly rents back in the “pot”.
The viability of a third casino in the state is sensitive to what
happens in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York.  Ever
since Foxwoods opened in 1992, various interests in our next-
door-neighbor states have yearned to join in the fun.  At the
moment, New York is the only entrant, under Governor Pataki’s
budget-driven program to allow up to six Indian casinos in his
state.  But the first one, just opened in Niagara Falls, poses little
threat to Connecticut’s market share.  More serious would be a
Massachusetts casino just east of Providence or a Rhode Island
casino just east of Stonington.  To date, though, all we’ve heard
from that quarter is talk, not pile drivers.
The inter-state dependence of course runs both ways in the
region around southeastern Connecticut.  Any Massachusetts or
Rhode Island casino proposed there would face an uphill battle
for financing precisely because Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun
have set the entry bar so high through their rapid, glamorous
expansion.  No glorified bingo hall is going to draw many
patrons away from the Connecticut casinos.
Proposals for a third casino in western Connecticut, e.g., in
Bridgeport or Waterbury, will face one big obstacle and several
imponderables.  The big obstacle will be the State of
Connecticut’s opposition to allowing slot machines, in order to
protect its existing crown-monopoly royalties.  A matching
imponderable is whether, or when, another tribe is going to gain
federal recognition, forcing the State to negotiate in good faith
over opening another casino.  (The Eastern Pequots face an
appeal of their recent recognition.)  The opening of a third
Indian-owned casino could well mean the State’s loss of its slots
royalties—and an added hole of nearly half a billion dollars in
the State budget.
A final imponderable is whether, or when, one of Gov. Pataki’s
six-pack of casinos will materialize in eastern New York state.
That could weaken the case for a third casino in Connecticut, and
even cut into Foxwoods’ and Mohegan Sun’s growth, in the
process putting at least a sizeable dent in our State’s budget.
Stay Tuned…
…and expect to keep seeing the Energizer bunny of
Connecticut politics march round and round. 
The author was a consultant to Foxwoods Casino in 1993 and to
the Mohegan tribe in its effort to build Mohegan Sun.  Both Foxwoods
and Mohegan Sun are Sustaining Partners of The Connecticut
Economy.  Neither casino nor its tribal owners is responsible for 
any opinions expressed above, or played any editorial role in the
preparation of this article.